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
THIRTEENTH PROGRESS REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN LIBERIA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of Security Council resolution 1014 (1995) of 15 September 1995, which extended the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) until 31 January 1996. In the resolution, the Council welcomed the recent Abuja Agreement signed by the Liberian parties (S/1995/742, annex), the installation of the new Council of State, the re-establishment of a comprehensive cease-fire, the beginning of the disengagement of forces and the agreement on a new timetable for the implementation of all the other aspects of the Agreement. The Council also requested me to submit, by the end of October 1995, recommendations concerning a new concept of operations for UNOMIL, which should address, inter alia, measures to enhance the relationship between UNOMIL and the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), aspects of disarming and demobilization, and the resources UNOMIL would require to carry out its tasks effectively.

2. In its resolution 1014 (1995), the Security Council welcomed my intention to dispatch a mission to Liberia to consult with the Liberian leaders and other interested parties on the requirements for the implementation of the Abuja Agreement. In that connection, I sent a technical team to Liberia, headed by my Deputy Military Advisor, Brigadier-General Abdul Ghani, from 19 to 30 September. The team subsequently travelled to Accra for consultations with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which were held on 2 October.

3. The present report provides an update on the political and military developments since my report of 13 September 1995 (S/1995/781) and contains recommendations on a new mandate and concept of operations for UNOMIL, based on lessons learned since the Mission was established by the Security Council by its resolution 866 (1993) of 22 September 1993.



II. POLITICAL SITUATION

4. Since its installation on 1 September 1995, the new Council of State has shown a strong determination to make the Liberian National Transitional Government (LNTG) an effective transitional government. Appointments to the Cabinet have been completed and the new Ministers were sworn into office on 26 September. Appointments to the Supreme Court have also been completed and the Ad Hoc Elections Commission has been reconstituted. In addition, the distribution of positions in Government, public corporations and autonomous agencies has been carried out in accordance with the formula provided in the Abuja Agreement.

5. The Council of State has directed all government departments and agencies to prepare plans for expanding the authority of the LNTG into the interior of the country and has declared its intention to reopen all roads to ensure free and secure access into the hinterland. In that connection, it is envisaged that local government administrations, which did not exist in most counties during the six years of civil war, will be re-established. The Supreme Court has also announced its intention to re-establish the judiciary system throughout the country.

6. The LNTG has established a committee headed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and comprising the Ministries of Justice and Defence, to prepare, in accordance with the peace agreements, a status-of-forces agreement with ECOWAS.

7. During its visit to Liberia, the technical team and my Special Representative, Mr. Anthony Nyakyi, met with LNTG Vice-Chairmen Charles Taylor and George Boley who expressed the determination of the Transitional Government to ensure the full and timely implementation of the peace process. The Vice-Chairmen recognized that it is the responsibility of the LNTG to ensure the effective implementation of the Abuja Agreement, including the disarming and demobilization of combatants. They expressed the desire of the LNTG to work closely with ECOWAS, UNOMIL and the international community in the implementation of the Agreement. In that connection, commissions have been appointed to oversee the process of disarming and demobilization; repatriation and resettlement; national reconstruction; the restructuring of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL); and the rehabilitation of the Liberian National Police.

8. My Special Representative welcomed the determination of the LNTG to ensure the full and timely implementation of the Agreement and assured the Vice-Chairmen of the United Nations readiness to work closely with the Transitional Government in that connection. In this regard, the Vice-Chairmen agreed that all available resources of the LNTG, ECOMOG and UNOMIL should be immediately mustered to begin the process of assembly and disarming of combatants.

9. The technical team briefed ECOWAS officials at Accra on 2 October on its visit to Liberia and on its preliminary recommendations for the new UNOMIL concept of operations, as well as its review of ECOMOG resource requirements. It was noted that all concerned, including the LNTG, UNOMIL and ECOMOG, agreed that the disarming and demobilization process should be shorter than originally envisaged under the Abuja Agreement and that the focus should be on the reintegration of ex-combatants.

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10. For their part, the ECOWAS officials briefed the technical team on the outcome of the visit in September of an ECOWAS delegation to donor Governments who had expressed interest in providing support for ECOMOG and the Liberian peace process in general.

11. ECOWAS has appointed a Special Representative to Liberia, Ambassador James Victor Gbeho, with effect from 15 September. It will be recalled that Ambassador Gbeho was until recently my Special Representative in Somalia. My Special Representative will work closely with him to facilitate effective implementation of the peace process.

III. MILITARY SITUATION

12. In accordance with the schedule of implementation of the Abuja Agreement, the cease-fire went into effect on 26 August 1995 and the factions were to disengage their forces during the period from 5 to 26 September. This was to be followed by the deployment of ECOMOG and UNOMIL from 2 October to 14 December, movement of combatants into assembly sites during the period from 9 November to 31 December and the commencement of disarming on 1 December.

Status of the cease-fire

13. Since it came into effect on 26 August, some violations of the cease-fire have been reported. These violations included intermittent fighting between the two wings of the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO), which began on 28 August in the area of Lofa Bridge, just north of Tubmanburg. The Cease-fire Violations Committee investigated the fighting on 12 September and found that control of the area, which is rich in diamonds, had changed hands between the two wings of ULIMO several times since late August. The Committee decided that both Alhaji Kromah's forces (ULIMO-K) and Roosevelt Johnson's forces (ULIMO-J) should disengage from the area by 16 September. That deadline was then extended to 23 September. While the factions have not yet disengaged their forces, as decided by the Cease-fire Violations Committee, fighting in the area had stopped by 16 September.

14. Fighting was also reported in Gbarnga on 2 October. While the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) has claimed that ULIMO-K attacked its forces in the area, ULIMO-K has stated that the incident resulted from fighting between rival groups within the NPFL. On 6 October, a joint investigation team, consisting of UNOMIL, ECOMOG, NPFL and ULIMO-K, travelled to the area to begin an investigation. The investigation has not yet been completed and the team has not so far been able to determine conclusively which faction was responsible. As a result of the fighting, all relief agencies in the area have temporarily relocated their staff to Monrovia and reduced their activities in the area.

15. Fighting was also reported to have occurred between the Liberian Peace Council (LPC) and NPFL on 17 September and between ULIMO-K and the NPFL on 3 and 11 October. These reports are being investigated.

16. In addition to the above-reported cease-fire violations, informal indications have also been received of harassment of civilians and looting of

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property by fighters of some factions, apparently acting on their own in search of food.

Status of disengagement of forces

17. As noted above, the parties were to have completed the disengagement of their forces by 26 September. In order to verify disengagement, ECOMOG and UNOMIL have undertaken joint monitoring missions to various areas. From information gathered by the missions, it has been determined that the factions have not yet entirely disengaged their forces or dismantled all their checkpoints.

18. ULIMO-J has fully disengaged from Bong Mines and removed its checkpoints in Kakata. The NPFL has also disengaged from Bong Mines but has not yet dismantled its checkpoints north of Konola. The AFL has dismantled its three checkpoints on the Buchanan-Harbel Highway, while LPC fighters around Buchanan are reported to be in the process of disengaging their forces. In Tubmanburg, however, the ECOMOG/UNOMIL joint verification team reported that ULIMO-K and ULIMO-J were maintaining their checkpoints and that disengagement had not yet been completed. The factions advised the team that, because of mutual distrust, it was unlikely that significant disengagement would take place until ECOMOG deployed to those areas.

19. The faction leaders are responsible for ensuring that their combatants disengage and disarm in accordance with the Abuja Agreement. In that connection, the verification team felt that the faction leaders needed to make more of an effort to visit their fighters and explain to them the procedures for the implementation of the Agreement, especially with regard to disengagement and disarming. The team also noted an apparent weakening in the command structure within some of the factions.

IV. MAIN OBJECTIVES AND REVISED MANDATE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
OBSERVER MISSION IN LIBERIA

20. UNOMIL was established as an observer mission to support the work of a subregional peace-keeping operation. It was the first example of such cooperation between the United Nations and a subregional organization. The Mission's mandate under Security Council resolution 866 (1993) reflected the responsibilities that the Liberian parties asked the United Nations to assume in Liberia under the Cotonou Agreement (S/26272, annex), which they signed on 25 July 1993. In that connection, ECOMOG was entrusted with the primary role in implementing the Agreement and UNOMIL was mandated to observe and monitor the various implementation procedures to ensure their impartial application.

21. Since the signing of the Cotonou Agreement, the parties have signed three supplementary agreements: the Akosombo Agreement of 24 September 1994 (S/1994/1174, annex), the Accra Agreement of 21 December 1994 (S/1995/7, annexes I and II) and the Abuja Agreement of 19 August 1995 (S/1995/742, annex). The Akosombo Agreement called upon the LNTG to play a more active role in ensuring that its provisions were carried out and, in that connection, called on the LNTG, ECOMOG and UNOMIL to collaborate in supervising and monitoring its

implementation. The Agreement also stipulated that the LNTG would enter into a status-of-forces agreement with ECOWAS and provided a more detailed plan for the disengagement, disarmament and demobilization of forces. Under the Accra Agreement, the parties agreed that in the reorganization of the Armed Forces of Liberia, the police, immigration and other security agencies, combatants and non-combatants who had the necessary qualifications should be considered for recruitment. They agreed that the Council of State would establish appropriate committees to be charged with determining the criteria for recruitment, taking advantage of the relevant expertise of ECOMOG and UNOMIL. While the Abuja Agreement addressed mainly the composition of the Council of State, it included an additional provision, calling upon ECOWAS, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations to monitor the operations of the Ad Hoc Elections Commission.

22. In accordance with those agreements, ECOWAS will continue to play the lead role in the peace process in Liberia, while ECOMOG will retain the primary responsibility for assisting the LNTG in the implementation of the military provisions of the agreements.

23. As regards UNOMIL, it is recommended that it should continue to have the mandate of observing and monitoring the implementation of the peace agreements, although the Security Council may wish to adjust the mandate to take into account developments in the peace process and experience gained over the past two years. I accordingly recommend to the Security Council that the main functions of UNOMIL be defined as follows:

(a) To exercise its good offices to support the efforts of ECOWAS and the LNTG to implement the peace agreements;

(b) To investigate all allegations of violations of the cease-fire reported to the Cease-fire Violations Committee, to recommend measures, in cooperation with ECOMOG and the LNTG, to prevent the recurrence of such violations and to report to the Secretary-General accordingly;

(c) To monitor compliance with the other military provisions of the peace agreements and to verify their impartial application, especially disarming and demobilization of combatants;

(d) To assist, as appropriate, in the maintenance of assembly sites agreed upon by ECOMOG, the LNTG and the factions, and in the implementation of a programme for demobilization of combatants, in cooperation with the LNTG, donor agencies and non-governmental organizations;

(e) To support, as appropriate, humanitarian assistance activities;

(f) To investigate and report to the Secretary-General on violations of human rights and to assist local human rights groups, as appropriate, in raising voluntary assistance for training and logistic support;

(g) To observe and verify the election process, in consultation with OAU and ECOWAS, including the legislative and presidential elections to be held in accordance with the provisions of the peace agreements.

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The structure proposed to enable UNOMIL to implement this mandate is set out in paragraphs 64 and 65 below.

V. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

A. Deployment of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group and the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia

24. In implementing the Abuja Agreement, ECOMOG has defined its tasks as the following: to monitor the borders of Liberia and man the main entry points by land, sea or air in order to ensure that no arms or ammunition are brought into the country; to assemble and disarm combatants of all factions; to establish checkpoints to verify the movement of arms and assist in the return of refugees and internally displaced persons; and to carry out intensive patrols throughout the country, so as to build confidence and create an atmosphere conducive to the holding of free and fair elections.

25. In order to fulfil these tasks, ECOMOG plans to increase its strength to 12,000 all ranks and to deploy its forces to nine safe havens (6,600 all ranks), 10 to 13 assembly sites (3,400 all ranks) and at 14 border crossing points (2,000 all ranks). For operational purposes, ECOMOG has divided the country into three sectors, each under the control of a brigade. Accordingly, ECOMOG brigade headquarters will be established at Gbarnga, Greenville and Tubmanburg. ECOMOG force headquarters will remain in Monrovia (see map in annex I).

26. For its part, UNOMIL will monitor and verify the implementation of the military provisions of the Abuja Agreement and will deploy its military observers with an emphasis on the most critical task of the peace process: disarmament and demobilization. Teams of United Nations military observers will co-deploy with ECOMOG troops at each of the assembly sites to monitor and verify the disarming of combatants. In addition, three mobile teams will be co-located with ECOMOG brigade headquarters. The leaders of the mobile teams will act as sector commanders for the UNOMIL military observers stationed at assembly sites in each sector. In addition, one mobile team will be stationed in Monrovia. These teams will investigate, jointly with ECOMOG and LNTG observers or independently, as required, reported violations of the cease-fire and arms embargo, as well as the disengagement of forces. The main headquarters of the UNOMIL military component will remain at UNOMIL headquarters in Monrovia.

27. In order to implement this concept of operations, it is estimated that approximately 160 military observers will be needed. These observers will be deployed to Liberia in accordance with operational requirements, with maximum strength being reached during the period of disarmament and demobilization, which is scheduled to take place between 1 December 1995 and 31 January 1996. The Mission's current strength is reflected in annex II.

28. UNOMIL will require additional air assets to enable the mobile teams to carry out their tasks effectively, that is, a total of three helicopters. These air assets will also be used, as appropriate, to support the activities of the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator.

29. In order to carry out their tasks effectively, UNOMIL military observers must enjoy, in accordance with established practice, unrestricted freedom of movement and access to all locations and information necessary for the discharge of their duties. The LNTG will be responsible for ensuring that the factions respect the status of United Nations personnel and extend full cooperation to UNOMIL, as stipulated under the Status-of-Mission Agreement entered into with the LNTG in 1994. At the same time, there will be a continuing requirement for ECOMOG to provide security for UNOMIL personnel and property. In that connection, UNOMIL and ECOMOG have agreed to undertake a joint security assessment in order to determine those areas of Liberia in which this requirement will exist.

30. UNOMIL and ECOMOG both recognize the need for enhanced coordination of their operational activities at all levels. It is envisaged that joint coordination meetings will be held at headquarters level on a weekly basis; similar coordination meetings will be held at the sector level twice a week; and coordinated operations will be maintained at assembly sites. UNOMIL and ECOMOG are also discussing the possibility of exchanging liaison officers in order to enhance the flow of information and the coordination of their respective activities.

B. Disarmament

31. Effective disarming and demobilization of combatants will be one of the most critical elements in the peace process. ECOMOG has established a Disarmament Committee, chaired by ECOMOG and consisting of UNOMIL, the LNTG and representatives of the Liberian factions. The factions have been requested to provide ECOMOG and UNOMIL with information on the number of their combatants; the areas in which they will be assembled; number of weapons; location of minefields; communications equipment; and number of prisoners of war.

32. The factions have so far provided the Disarmament Committee with information on the location of their proposed assembly sites and the numbers of their combatants. With regard to the list of fighters, the Disarmament Committee has received the following information: the NPFL has indicated that it has 25,000 combatants; AFL has 8,734 combatants; ULIMO-J has 7,776 combatants; ULIMO-K has 12,460 combatants; and the LPC has 4,650 combatants; and the Lofa Defence Force (LDF) has 750 combatants. It thus appears that up to 60,000 combatants will have to be disarmed. It should be noted that, since the signing of the Abuja Agreement, a total of only 133 combatants have disarmed to ECOMOG.

33. ECOMOG and UNOMIL are undertaking joint reconnaissance missions in order to survey proposed assembly sites, where combatants will be disarmed and demobilized. In accordance with the Abuja Agreement, the assembly areas are to be prepared to receive combatants by 9 November. It is envisaged that UNOMIL will provide basic resources required to maintain the sites. Requirements will include food, water and sanitation facilities and materials for the minimum rehabilitation of the sites. Some assistance may also be required to facilitate the movement of combatants to the sites.

34. As combatants move into assembly sites, they will be disarmed by ECOMOG, under the observation and verification of UNOMIL. They will then be demobilized by UNOMIL. The LNTG, ECOMOG and UNOMIL have agreed that this process should be completed as swiftly as possible. Hence the original process of assembly, encampment, disarmament and demobilization envisaged under the Abuja Agreement will be adjusted and the focus of assistance will be placed on facilitating the successful re-integration of ex-combatants into civilian life. The demobilization process is discussed in more detail in the humanitarian section of the present report.

VI. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES MONITORING GROUP

35. ECOMOG has estimated that it would require some 12,000 troops to carry out its concept of operations. Its current strength is 7,269 all ranks. It will therefore require an additional 4,731 troops. During the eleventh meeting of the ECOWAS Chiefs of Staff, held in Monrovia on 9 October 1995, the representative of Nigeria indicated that his Government would provide two additional battalions. Ghana and Guinea have also indicated that they would each be prepared to provide an additional battalion. The Chiefs of Staff of other ECOWAS countries indicated that their countries were in principle prepared to contribute troops to ECOMOG, subject to the availability of the required financial and logistical support.

36. In that connection, my technical team worked closely with ECOMOG in reviewing its logistic requirements. Under present conditions, ECOMOG deployment capability is limited and substantial additional logistic assistance would be required to enable it to carry out fully its responsibilities under the Abuja Agreement. ECOMOG indicated that its priority needs included vehicles, communications, spare parts and fuel.

37. It will be recalled that a severe shortage of logistic support was a main reason for the inability of ECOMOG to carry out its tasks under the Cotonou Agreement. As the Chairman of ECOWAS and I have stated repeatedly, it is imperative to the success of the peace process that ECOMOG be provided with the logistic support it needs. An ECOWAS delegation visited potential donor countries in September to raise resources for ECOMOG. The Chairman of ECOWAS has also held bilateral consultations to encourage donor Governments to respond positively to ECOMOG requirements.

38. Following consultations with the LNTG and the Chairman of ECOWAS, I have decided to convene a conference on assistance to Liberia in New York on 27 October 1995. The conference will focus on support required for the implementation of the Abuja Agreement, including humanitarian assistance, the disarmament and demobilization processes, recovery and rehabilitation needs, as well as assistance to ECOMOG. Detailed information in this regard, including an annotated budget containing ECOMOG logistic requirements, is being made available to Member States participating in the conference.

VII. HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS

A. Present situation

39. The signing of the Abuja Agreement and consequent political developments have had a significant impact on humanitarian assistance activities in Liberia. Relief assistance must now be extended to civilians living in areas that were previously inaccessible. Provision must be made for the repatriation of refugees and resettlement of internally displaced persons. The programme must also expand to address the humanitarian aspects of the demobilization of former combatants and their integration into civilian life. Mr. Peter Hansen, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, has just returned from Liberia where he verified the urgent need for humanitarian action on a greater scale, including improved coordination measures.

40. Coordination mechanisms will be expanded and strengthened to address the new requirements. A United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator will be appointed. Serving under the overall authority of my Special Representative, the Humanitarian Coordinator will support and coordinate the efforts of the operational agencies of the United Nations such as the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Programme (WFP), while mobilizing increased participation by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Health Organization (WHO) in relief and resettlement activities and in the provision of assistance to demobilizing soldiers. Other United Nations agencies, such as the International Labour Organization (ILO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the United Nations Volunteers (UNV), will contribute in areas related to their mandates. The Humanitarian Coordinator will also support the efforts of the wider humanitarian community, including non-governmental, international and multilateral organizations.

41. The Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit will consist of two offices: the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Office and the Demobilization and Reintegration Office. The Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Office will support the Humanitarian Coordinator in carrying out his duties. The Demobilization and Reintegration Office will organize, and be responsible for delivering, services for the demobilization of combatants and for assisting and coordinating programmes to facilitate their return to productive life in civilian society. The Demobilization and Reintegration Office will be represented in each of the demobilization centres.

42. The humanitarian needs in Liberia and other countries of the subregion are substantial. Out of a total population of approximately 2.3 million people, about 1.5 million people living in the country, including some 700,000 displaced persons, continue to require humanitarian assistance. In addition, UNHCR estimates that 727,000 Liberian refugees have sought asylum in neighbouring countries: 367,300 in Côte d'Ivoire, 395,000 in Guinea, 14,000 in Ghana, 4,600 in Sierra Leone and 4,000 in Nigeria. The reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons, most of whom were farmers, and ex-combatants to their home communities will be a critical factor in sustaining the peace process. In the coming months, humanitarian assistance organizations will be

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working to assist and facilitate reintegration and the emphasis of their activities will be on assisting people to begin rebuilding their lives and their communities. While emergency relief programmes will continue for some time in order to meet immediate life-saving needs, they will be designed to permit an easy transition from relief to rehabilitation.

43. UNHCR is preparing for the repatriation of refugees with a view to starting the operation in early 1996, if security conditions permit. It will encourage voluntary repatriation only if ECOMOG has fully deployed to major areas of return and there has been substantial disarming and demobilization of combatants, thus creating the conditions necessary for the safe return of refugees and enabling UNHCR and its partners to have access to and work with returnee communities.

B. Demobilization and reintegration

44. The demobilization and reintegration into civil society of the estimated 60,000 combatants will be critical to the success of the peace process. The LNTG Disarmament and Demobilization Commission will oversee the disarmament and demobilization of combatants. UNOMIL, ECOMOG and the donor community have held extensive consultations on the process and have shared their findings with the newly formed LNTG Commission.

45. As noted above, a large percentage of Liberia's population is displaced and many communities to which refugees and others are expected to return have suffered neglect or destruction during the civil war. It is widely agreed that the reintegration of combatants should be addressed in conjunction with the reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons. It is also agreed that the success of the demobilization process will depend on whether ex-combatants can find ways of sustaining themselves other than by the rule of the gun. In that connection, short-term employment opportunities for ex-combatants should be provided as part of the rehabilitation of communities to which refugees and others are expected to return. These considerations form the basis of the demobilization and reintegration strategy.

46. As already mentioned, the demobilization process will take place in 10 to 13 centres located in the vicinity of assembly sites, where ex-combatants will be registered and receive initial assistance after they are disarmed by ECOMOG. The Demobilization and Reintegration Office will manage the provision of food, health services, locally produced shelter and water and basic sanitation requirements for the centres. Following registration, disarmed combatants will participate in a brief training programme that will help prepare them for return to civilian life. The programme will provide information on the peace process and the overall situation in Liberia, as well as counselling assistance on the options available for reintegration into civilian life.

47. As noted above, it is desirable for ex-combatants to be immediately engaged in productive activities upon demobilization. United Nations agencies, non-governmental organizations and bilateral donors are planning programmes of reintegration assistance, which will address the needs of ex-combatants, internally displaced persons and refugees. However, there may be a time lag of

two or three months between demobilization and the time these programmes become operational. It is essential that, during that period, ex-combatants, especially those who may have no means of livelihood, do not rearm or turn to banditry.

48. Accordingly, it is envisaged that assistance for the demobilization process will be provided under the assessed budget, including short-term assistance to help combatants for a two- or three-month period following demobilization, after which they will be absorbed into the reintegration programmes. However, if voluntary contributions are made available to bridge the gap between demobilization and reintegration, the assessed budget will be reduced accordingly. All other programmes related to reintegration will be funded by voluntary contributions from the donor community.

49. For those combatants who have means of gaining a living after demobilization, kits including agricultural or carpentry tools will be provided. Food assistance may also be needed for a short transition period. A second type of assistance will engage ex-combatants unable to maintain themselves in the rehabilitation of basic infrastructure in those communities to which refugees and internally displaced persons are to return, thus providing short-term employment opportunities, while longer-term reintegration programmes are being developed. In that connection, WFP is being consulted on the possible implementation of food-for-work programmes for ex-combatants.

50. As regards child fighters, it is generally accepted that they should return at the earliest possible opportunity to their home communities, where they will be helped to readjust to civilian life. UNICEF and its traditional partners have established programmes to address the specific needs of child soldiers. These programmes will be expanded as disarmament and demobilization progress.

51. In addition to the resources mentioned in paragraph 48 above, it is foreseen that the assessed budget will also meet the costs related to the Demobilization and Reintegration Office, as well as the necessary personnel required to carry out the programme.

VIII. HUMAN RIGHTS

52. It has been reported that an undetermined number of civilians were killed by a group of NPFL soldiers in Tapeta between 26 and 28 September. The NPFL has announced that it is conducting an investigation and that it has detained those alleged to have been involved, who will be tried by a national court. UNOMIL has consulted the LNTG and the NPFL and has been granted permission to interview those detained. UNOMIL will also maintain liaison, as part of its investigation, with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and local human rights groups.

53. It will be recalled that the current mandate of UNOMIL in relation to human rights, under resolution 866 (1993), is to report on any major violations of international humanitarian law. UNOMIL currently has one human rights officer who is responsible for investigating and reporting on human rights violations.

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54. Under its revised mandate, UNOMIL would continue to report on human rights violations and would also maintain liaison with local human rights groups and assist them, as appropriate, in raising voluntary contributions for training and logistic support. It is also envisaged that UNOMIL would maintain liaison with the LNTG, ECOWAS and ICRC with regard to civilians who have been detained without trial.

IX. OTHER ASPECTS

A. Information

55. The current UNOMIL information programme is aimed at providing the population at large with factual information about the peace process, and the role of UNOMIL and the United Nations system in Liberia. The programme is currently managed by two international staff members.

56. With the signing of the Abuja Agreement, it is foreseen that the programme will expand its activities, focusing on the use of print, radio and video materials to disseminate information on the various stages of the implementation process, especially regarding disarming and demobilization. Additional resources and staff will be required for this purpose.

B. Elections

57. In accordance with the Abuja Agreement, legislative and presidential elections are scheduled to take place on 20 August 1996. The Agreement calls upon the United Nations, in collaboration with OAU and ECOWAS, to observe and verify the electoral process. In due course, I shall submit to the Security Council additional recommendations about the role which the United Nations could play in this regard.

C. Police

58. The technical team referred to in paragraph 2 above included a police advisor, whose task was to assess the needs of the Liberian National Police and to determine what assistance could be provided to the LNTG to strengthen the police force.

59. The Liberian National Police falls under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice. It consists of 2,219 officers, the majority of whom are unarmed and serve in the city of Monrovia, with a few deployed in the surrounding counties. The police force has very few vehicles and most officers lack basic communications equipment. It includes a Special Task Force of 245 officers trained in riot control and a Rapid Response Unit of 97 officers, the only armed officers in the force, who are trained to respond to armed robberies. The average pay of a Liberian police officer is some \$4 per month.

60. The LNTG informed the technical team that it required technical assistance in the restructuring and management of the National Police, as well as financial

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and logistic support to obtain uniforms and communications and transportation equipment.

61. Most of the officers currently serving in the police force require training of some sort, whether basic, refresher or specialized. There is capacity for training at the National Police Academy, which has maintained some instructors, but, in general, the Academy has been severely weakened by the war and is in need of basic technical and financial assistance, including training material, the training of trainers and the rehabilitation of buildings.

62. As regards the penitentiary system, the Monrovia Central Police Prison is the only such official facility currently operating in the country. The prison is, however, in a state of disrepair and is only minimally functional in terms of water, sanitation, ventilation, space and security requirements. There is an immediate need for support in terms of food and medical care. The 34 guards at the prison require training, uniforms and equipment. Of the 181 inmates, 4 have been tried, convicted and sentenced, and the other 177 have been detained without trial, most for a period of several months. The Liberian judicial system officially functions only in Monrovia. Even limited support from the international community would be of significant benefit.

63. Technical assistance is thus required both for the police and for the judicial system. I urge Member States to provide it to the LNTG.

X. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

64. To perform the mandate described in the present report, the organizational structure of UNOMIL would be as follows:

(a) The Mission, with its headquarters in Monrovia, would continue to be headed by a Special Representative. The present composition of the Office of the Special Representative, headed by a Director and including a total of eight Professional staff, would be essentially maintained, although a small increase in its staff might become necessary as the peace process unfolds;

(b) The Military Component would be headed by a Chief Military Observer and would include a total of 160 military observers. The observers would be stationed at assembly sites and co-located, in mobile teams, with ECOMOG brigade headquarters;

(c) The Demobilization and Reintegration Office would be headed by a senior officer, reporting to the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator, under the overall authority of my Special Representative, and assisted by the appropriate number of international and local staff;

(d) The administrative component would be headed by a Chief Administrative Officer.

65. My Special Representative would have overall authority regarding all activities undertaken by the United Nations in Liberia in support of the peace process and would be responsible for their coordination, so as to ensure the

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most efficient possible use of resources. All UNOMIL components would rely on integrated logistic, air support, communications and medical evacuation systems.

XI. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

66. As indicated in my last report to the Security Council (S/1995/781), the General Assembly, in its resolution 49/232 B of 12 July 1995, appropriated to the special account of UNOMIL the amount of \$8,527,300 gross, equivalent to a monthly rate of \$1,421,200 gross for the maintenance of the Mission for the period from 1 July to 31 December 1995.

67. Should the Security Council decide to adjust the mandate and concept of operations of UNOMIL, as recommended in paragraph 72 below, the consequent requirements for the maintenance and operation of UNOMIL will be sought from the General Assembly at its current session.

68. As at 16 October 1995, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNOMIL special account since the inception of the Mission amounted to \$13.3 million. The total of outstanding assessed contributions for all peace-keeping operations on 16 October 1995 was \$2,364 million. A loan of \$2 million, which was borrowed from the Peace-keeping Reserve Fund in order to provide UNOMIL with the necessary cash flow requirements, remains unpaid.

69. Since my last report, no further voluntary contributions have been received for the Trust Fund for the Implementation of the Cotonou Agreement in Liberia.

XII. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

70. With the signing of the Abuja Agreement, the Liberian peace process has entered a new phase. Over the past two months, the Liberian parties have re-established the cease-fire, installed the Council of State and shown a greater willingness than in the past to take steps towards the restoration of peace and stability in their country. As a result, an opportunity now exists for bringing to an end the civil war that has ravaged Liberia and brought great suffering to its people for nearly six years.

71. I am encouraged by this progress and I earnestly hope that the Council of State and the faction leaders will abide by their commitments under the Abuja Agreement. Much credit for the positive developments of the last few months is due to the Chairman of ECOWAS and to the efforts that States members of ECOWAS have made to harmonize and coordinate their policies towards Liberia. The Abuja Agreement represented a culmination of those efforts and has enhanced the ability of ECOWAS to lead the peace process to a successful conclusion. I encourage the members of ECOWAS to continue to work closely together for the full and timely implementation of the Agreement.

72. In view of these developments and on the basis of the assessment provided by my technical team, I recommend that the Security Council approve the adjustments to the UNOMIL mandate and concept of operations set out in the present report. These adjustments are based on the lessons learned in the

implementation of the Cotonou Agreement, as well as on the developments that have occurred in the Liberian peace process since the establishment of UNOMIL two years ago. The proposed expansion has been designed to enable UNOMIL to perform the observation and monitoring functions foreseen for the United Nations under the various peace agreements, while placing greater emphasis on the most critical aspect of the implementation of those agreements, namely, disarming and demobilization. It is in this way that UNOMIL and the international community can best assist the LNTG, ECOWAS and ECOMOG in the discharge of the responsibilities entrusted to them under the peace agreements. In letters to me dated 28 August and 12 September 1995, the current Chairman of ECOWAS, President Rawlings, urged that the United Nations should assume a more active role in Liberia. I am convinced that, notwithstanding the acute financial crisis currently facing the Organization, the provision of additional resources to UNOMIL, at a level that is modest by comparison with peace-keeping operations elsewhere, is justified by the hope that the Abuja Agreement at last offers a chance of ending the cruel war in Liberia and alleviating the terrible suffering it has caused. The related cost estimates for a six-month period will be issued shortly as an addendum to the present report.

73. The allocation of additional resources to UNOMIL must, however, go hand in hand with the provision by the international community of the necessary financial and logistic support to ECOMOG. In my report of 9 September 1993 on the establishment of UNOMIL (S/26422 and Add.1 and Add.1/Corr.1), I pointed out that the Mission would be able to discharge its mandate only if ECOMOG had adequate resources to carry out its own responsibilities and that, in the absence of such resources, the peace process itself might be jeopardized. Despite voluntary contributions from some Member States, either through the Trust Fund I established for the purpose or on a bilateral basis, ECOMOG never received the logistic and financial support required to implement its mandate.

74. It is therefore imperative for the successful implementation of the Abuja Agreement that ECOMOG receive the resources it needs. ECOWAS member States have demonstrated their commitment to the peace process by pledging additional troops for ECOMOG. In addition, the Chairman of ECOWAS has undertaken a number of initiatives to raise the necessary financial and logistic resources. The conference on assistance to Liberia, which I am convening in New York on 27 October, will provide an opportunity for donor Governments to respond to those needs and to demonstrate their support for peace in Liberia.

75. In the final analysis, however, the responsibility for carrying the peace process forward rests with the LNTG and the Liberian faction leaders. They must rise above their differences and lead their respective combatants along the path of peace and reconciliation. They must impress upon them the need to respect the cease-fire scrupulously, to complete the disengagement process and to move to the assembly sites so that disarming can begin on schedule on 1 December 1995. I am concerned, in this regard, about the recent reports of cease-fire violations and the delays that such incidents have created in the disengagement process. The LNTG should take the necessary action to avoid further incidents and maintain the momentum of the peace process.

76. International support for the implementation of the peace process should also include assistance to help the Transitional Government carry out its

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responsibilities under the peace agreements and create the conditions necessary for national reconciliation and peace-building. There is no doubt, however, that the response of the international community will depend on evidence of the Liberian factions' determination to fulfil, in a timely manner, the commitments they freely entered into under the Abuja Agreement. I urge them finally to give peace a chance.

ANNEX II

Composition of the military component of the United Nations
Observer Mission in Liberia as at 18 October 1995

	<u>Observers</u>	<u>Others</u>	<u>Total</u>
Bangladesh	2	7 <u>a/</u>	9
China	5	-	5
Czech Republic	6	-	6
Egypt	3	-	3
Guinea-Bissau	8	-	8
India	2	-	2
Jordan	3	-	3
Kenya	8	-	8
Malaysia	8	-	8
Pakistan	6	-	6
Uruguay	<u>2</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>2</u>
Total	<u>53</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>60</u>

a/ Medical staff.
